Report of the County Investigating Grand Jury of May 15, 1986
Investigation of city officials
This lengthy report by the County Investigating Grand Jury examines the history of MOVE and breaks down each of the decisions made on May 13, 1985. Much like the Special Investigation Committee, they decided that no criminal act was committed, but that poor planning and communication resulted in a botched operation. While the decision not to pursue punishment for those involved might set a dangerous precedent, the findings of official invesitgations like this one served as its own kind of punishment; the failures of the top officials of Philadelphia city governmentwere laid bare for all to see.<br /><br />Part 1 - Introduction<br />Part 2- History of MOVE<br />Part 3 - Planning for the Serving of Warrants at 6221 Osage Avenue<br />Part 4 - Legal Ramifications of the Children's Presence<br />Part 5 - Some Tangential Legal Matters<br />Part 6 - The Morning of May 13, 1985<br />Part 7 - The Use of the Satchel Charge<br />Part 8 - The Decision to Let The Fire Burn<br />Part 9 - Evening Occurences in the Back Alley<br />Part 10 - The Fire Department's Handling of the Fire<br />Part 11 - Evidence Retrieval and Analysis<br />Part 12 - The C-4 Cover-Up and Related Issues/Conclusion
County Investigating Grand Jury
May 15, 1986
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English
Legal Report
The Philadelphia Special Investigation Commission's Report
Investigation of city officials
In this detailed report, the Special Investigation Commission laid out the facts of the incident as well as their findings and recommendations for the future. While they condemned the actions of Mayor Goode, Commissioner Sambor, and Commissioner Richmond, the commission did not advise any criminal charges. This was seen as an incident of negligence and faulty planning rather than an act with criminal intent. While it was certainly easy for the commission to critique the decisions made well after the event, they did raise some legitimate issues with how the city planned for and handled the confrontation with MOVE.<br /><br />Introduction - pg. 1-3<br />Chronology - pg. 5-7<br />Summary of Findings and Conclusions - pg. 9-10<br />Detailed Findings and Conclusions - pg. 11-21<br />Recommendations: Operation of City Government - pg. 23<br />Recommendations: Operation of the Police Department - pg. 23-24<br />Recommendations: Police and Fire Department Coordination - pg. 25<br />Recommendations: Local Government Response to Crisis Situations: pg. 25<br />Recommendations: Laws and Regulations - pg. 25-26<br />Recommendations: Disciplinary Action and Further Investigation - pg. 26<br />Additional Comments - pg. 27<br />Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Bruce W. Kauffman - pg. 1-4 of addendum
The Philadelphia Special Investigation Commission
March 6, 1986
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English
Official Government Document
"I Was Expendable," Sambor Learned After Move Fiasco
The investigation of city officials
Police Commissioner Sambor submitted his resignation in November of 1985 following the backlash against his actions in the MOVE bombing. At the time, he claimed that he was not being forced out of his position. However, just three months later in a report by Allentown, PA's <em>The Morning Call</em>, Sambor claimed that Mayor Goode was making him a scapegoat for the incident. He said in January of 1986 that he "was given a choice... to retire or be fired." Police union officials and detractors of Goode saw this move as Goode refusing to accept blame personally, and instead passing off the guilt to others.
Scott J. Higham
The Morning Call
February 27, 1986
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English
Newspaper Article